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Abstract I study the economic consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries
for the design of incentive contracts. The analysis is based on an agency model in
which the firm’s cash flow is a function of the agent’s effort and an observable
random factor beyond the agent’s control. According to my analysis, limiting the tax
deductibility of fixed wages has two consequences. The principal rewards the agent
on the basis of the observable random factor and adjusts the amount of performance-
based pay in the optimal incentive contract. The new contract can have weaker or
stronger work incentives than without the tax. The theoretical findings have
implications for empirical compensation research. First, the analysis shows that
reward for luck can be the optimal response to recent tax law changes, whereas
earlier empirical literature has attributed this phenomenon to managerial
entrenchment. Second, I demonstrate that a simple regression analysis that fails to
control for separable measures of luck is likely to find an increased pay for per-
formance sensitivity as a response to the introduction of tax deductibility limits on
salaries even if the pay for performance sensitivity has actually declined.
Keywords Executive compensation  Agency theory 
Relative performance evaluation
JEL Classifications M40  M52  H32
Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code limits the tax deductibility of
executive compensation in publicly held corporations to $1 million per year. This
‘‘million-dollar tax cap’’ generally applies to the salary of the CEO and those of the
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next four highest compensated executives of the firm. Performance-based compen-
sation is exempted from corporate taxation if it is paid on a commission basis or
granted in accordance with a qualified bonus plan.1
The million-dollar tax cap was introduced in 1993 as a response to growing
public concern about increasing executive pay. Advocates of the new tax rule
seemed to believe that raising the cost of executive pay to shareholders would
discourage firms from granting ‘‘excessive’’ compensation packages to their
executives. Somewhat ironically, executive pay continued to grow considerably
after the introduction of section 162(m). For example, the average total pay of S&P
500 CEOs rose from $2.6 million in 1993 to $14 million in 2000. Even after the
burst of the stock market bubble in 2002, the average total CEO pay was
$9.4 million. At the same time, the structure of executive pay has changed
significantly during the past decade. In 1993, base salary accounted for 37% of the
average total CEO pay, but by 2002 this portion dropped to 19%. This structural
change was mainly driven by the increased use of stock options, which accounted
for 24% of the average total CEO pay in 1993 as compared to 47% in 2002.2
The empirical evidence on the impact of section 162(m) on the level and the
structure of executive pay is mixed. Perry and Zenner (2001) analyze a sample of
firms affected by the million-dollar cap and find that real compensation levels have
increased, mainly due to the grant of stock options. They also report a reduced
salary growth rate and an increased pay for performance sensitivity. These results
are supported by Hall and Liebman (2000), who identify a decline in salary that is
more than offset by additional bonus payments and stock option grants.3 On the
other hand, Johnson et al. (2001) find an increased pay for performance sensitivity
but they cannot attribute it to the introduction of section 162(m). Finally, Rose and
Wolfram (2002) find that the million-dollar tax cap has created a focal point for the
determination of salaries, but they find little evidence for a significant impact of
section 162(m) on total compensation levels and the pay for performance relation.
Even if section 162(m) has encouraged firms to tighten the link between firm
performance and executive compensation, it is not obvious that the modified pay
structure has improved the executives’ work incentives. In particular, Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001) find that CEOs are frequently rewarded for luck. They define
luck as ‘‘changes in firm performance beyond the CEO’s control’’ and use oil price
movements, changes in exchange rates and mean industry performance to measure
it. They explain their findings with the skimming hypothesis, according to which
managers are able to set their own pay due to failures in firms’ governance
structures.4
1 For qualifying as ‘‘performance-based remuneration’’ a number of requirements must be met, see
Balsam and Ryan (1996), or Balsam and Yin (2005) for details and illustrative examples of company
practice.
2 For more details, see e.g. Hall and Murphy (2003) or Jensen et al. (2004).
3 Similar observations are reported in Rose and Wolfram (2000), Balsam and Ryan (2005a, b), who find
an increased pay for performance relation for executives hired after the introduction of section 162(m).
4 See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000, 2001). The ‘‘skimming hypothesis’’ has been put forward by
practitioners such as Crystal (1991) as well as by academics, such as Bebchuk and Fried (2003), who also
refer to it as the ‘‘managerial power approach’’.
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Motivated by the mixed empirical findings, I study the consequences of tax
deductibility limits on salaries for the design of incentive contracts. The analysis is
based on a linear agency model in which the firm’s cash flow is a function of the
agent’s effort and an observable random factor with positive mean. In the absence of
tax restrictions, the observable factor is filtered out of the performance measure
because it makes the contract riskier without providing better incentives.
Limiting the tax deductibility of salaries provides incentives for substituting a
part of the agent’s fixed wage by an increased amount of variable pay to minimize
the corporate tax bill. I find that these incentives can significantly distort the
structure of the optimal compensation contract. According to my analysis, a tax cap
on salaries has two effects. First, it triggers reward for luck, and second, it provides
incentives for adjusting the amount of performance-based pay. Intuition suggests
that a fiscal discrimination of salaries would always result in an increasing amount
of performance-based pay and thereby also boost the agent’s equilibrium effort.
Somewhat surprisingly, I find that this conjecture may be misleading. In my model,
the agent’s equilibrium effort can generally increase or decrease as a response to the
introduction of the tax cap.
This result can be explained by the fact that changing the amount of variable pay
has two countervailing effects. Augmenting the amount of variable pay increases
the agent’s expected remuneration, but it also increases the risk premium for which
the principal must compensate the agent. If the principal wants the agent to accept a
new contract with higher variable pay, he can only cut the salary if the marginal
increase of variable pay is larger than the incremental risk premium. For the
separable random factor, this condition is always met. It has a positive mean, and its
marginal risk premium equals zero in the optimal contract in absence of the tax cap.
Therefore, tying the agent’s pay to this factor will always allow for a reduction of
the agent’s salary without violating his participation constraint. However, for the
performance-based bonus, it may well be the case that the marginal risk premium is
larger than the marginal increase of variable pay. If this condition is met, it is
impossible to offer the agent an acceptable contract with increased incentives and a
lower salary. Accordingly, the principal must simultaneously cut the salary and the
amount of performance-based pay for reducing his tax due.
My paper extends recent work of Halperin et al. (2001). They consider a binary
agency model with continuous effort but they do not consider the use of multiple
performance measures, nor do they address the empirical phenomenon of reward for
luck. However, in contrast to my analysis they find that the tax on fixed wages
unambiguously raises the amount of performance-based pay. Intuitively, this
conflicting prediction can be explained by the fact that the marginal risk premium is
monotonically decreasing in the agent’s equilibrium effort in the model of Halperin
et al. (2001) but monotonically increasing in the linear agency model. In Sect. 4, I
discuss the issue in detail. I also demonstrate that the substitution effect between
performance-based pay and reward for luck can also be established in a binary
agency model with discrete effort.
Based on my theoretical results, I discuss implications for empirical compen-
sation research. First, I demonstrate that my model predicts a positive relation
between the agent’s pay and the separable random factor in the firm’s cash flow. A
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one-to-one estimation of my theoretical model would support the findings of
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) in an optimal contracting model without referring
to managerial entrenchment. Second, I show that pay for performance regressions
that fail to control for observable measures of luck are likely to find that the pay for
performance sensitivity has increased as a response to section 162(m) even if it has
actually declined. These findings underline the importance of controlling for
separable measures of luck in empirical compensation research to avoid biased
estimates of pay for performance sensitivities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 explains the model
assumptions. In Sect. 2, I derive the optimal incentive contracts with and without the
tax constraint. Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of my theoretical results and
their implications for empirical compensation research. Section 4 concludes.
1 Model assumptions
I consider a linear agency model with a risk-neutral firm owner (the principal) and a
risk- and effort-averse manager (the agent), who runs the business on behalf of the
owner. The firm’s cash flow from operations comprises the agent’s contribution and
two different random factors beyond the agent’s control. It is given by the following
expression:
x ¼ b  a þ c  z þ e: ð1Þ
The variable a denotes the agent’s effort and the parameter b, b [ 0, measures the
marginal impact of managerial effort on the firm’s cash flow. The agent’s effort is
unobservable for the principal. The other cash flow components, z and e, are the
realizations of two independent, normally distributed random variables ez and e;
respectively. I assume that e has zero mean and variance r2e ; and that ez has mean
E½ez ¼ l[ 0 and variance r2z :
The random variables ez and e represent the impact of uncontrollable events on
the firm’s cash flow. Splitting the random factors into two components allows me to
distinguish between measurable and unmeasurable factors affecting cash flow from
operations. I assume that ez is separately measurable but e is not. Illustrative
examples for the measurable factor ez are input prices or foreign currency exchange
rates. Similarly, if x is interpreted as the firm’s stock price, ez can be interpreted as
the stock price of a benchmark firm operating in the same industry or a stock price
index. The impact of the observable factor on the firm’s performance is captured by
the parameter c. In general, c can take any sign, but for the ease of exposition I
subsequently assume that c [ 0. The impact of all other uncontrollable factors on
the firm’s cash flow, such as unexpected problems with large suppliers and
customers, industry shocks, or political events, is captured by the random variable e:
The agent is risk averse and dislikes to work hard. I assume that exerting effort
causes personal cost of C(a) on the part of agent. I assume that the cost function is
monotonically increasing and convex in a, i.e. C0 [ 0, C@[ 0, where the dashes
denote the first and second derivative of C with respect to a. For motivating the
agent to work hard, the principal offers him a performance-based remuneration
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contract. A natural measure for evaluating the agent’s performance is the firm’s cash
flow. To avoid rewarding the agent for good luck (or punishing her for bad luck) the
principal evaluates the agent’s performance relative to the realized value of the
measurable random factor ez: I assume that the principal offers the agent the
following linear compensation contract:
s ¼ w þ v; v ¼ vx  x þ vz  z; ð2Þ
where w denotes a fixed wage; v denotes the total of the agent’s variable com-
pensation; vx is the bonus coefficient placed on cash flow; and vz is the weight put on
the realization of the measurable random factor ez: To derive closed form solutions
for the optimal compensation contract, I assume that the agent exhibits a negative
exponential utility function with constant absolute risk aversion, U(s(), C(a)) =
-exp-r[s()-C(a)]. Combined with the assumption of normally distributed noise
terms, this particular utility function allows for presenting the agent’s objective
function by his certainty equivalent.5
CEA ¼ E½s  CðaÞ  RðsÞ; RðsÞ ¼ r
2
 Var½s: ð3Þ
The agent’s certainty equivalent comprises his expected wage, his cost of effort
C(a), and the risk premium R(s). The risk premium depends on the variance of the
agent’s compensation, Var[s] and the agents’ coefficient of absolute risk aversion, r.
The critical element in my analysis is the consideration of a corporate tax on
fixed wages. As in Halperin et al. (2001), I assume that fixed wages can only be
deducted from the corporate tax bill up to an amount of w: This assumption
corresponds exactly to the one million-dollar tax cap in section 162(m) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Assuming a corporate tax rate of s, the principal’s objective
function can be stated as follows:
P ¼ ð1  sÞ  ðE½x  E½sÞ  max 0; s  ðw  wÞf g ð4Þ
According to (4), the principal maximizes the difference between the expected cash
flow and the agent’s compensation after taxes. If he sets the fixed wage w above the
tax limit of w he has to pay additional taxes of s  ðw  wÞ: I next analyze how the
existence of the tax cap on fixed wages affects the design of the optimal
compensation contract.
2 Optimal linear incentive contracts
2.1 Unconstrained solution
In this section, I present the standard solution of the model, assuming that the tax
constraint does not bind. The principal maximizes his after-tax income in (4) subject
to the following two constraints
5 See e.g. Hemmer (2004), who also provides a critical assessment of the ‘‘LEN-model’’ and its
limitations. The formal introduction of the model is frequently attributed to Holmstro¨m and Milgrom
(1987) but at least the term ‘‘LEN-model’’ goes back to Spremann (1987).
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a ¼ arg max
a
CEA ¼ E½s  CðaÞ  r
2
 Var½s ð5Þ
E½s  CðaÞ  r
2
 Var½s U; ð6Þ
where U denotes the agent’s reservation utility. The first constraint in (5) is the
incentive constraint. It ensures that the principal correctly anticipates the agent’s
utility maximizing effort choice when designing his contract offer. The second
constraint in (6) is the agent’s participation constraint. It ensures that the agent
weakly prefers to accept the contract instead of refusing it.
For determining the agent’s optimal effort choice, I first evaluate the expectation
and the variance of the agent’s remuneration. For the contract defined in (2), I get:
E s½  ¼ w þ E½v ¼ w þ vx  b  a þ ðvx  c þ vzÞ  l; ð7Þ
Var s½  ¼ v2x  r2e þ ðvx  c þ vzÞ2  r2z : ð8Þ
Inserting the expressions in (7) and (8) into the agent’s objective function in (3) and
maximizing it with respect to a yields the following first order condition for the
agent’s effort choice:
vx  b ¼ C0ðaÞ ð9Þ
Condition (9) states that the agent’s effort is determined by equating his expected
marginal compensation with his marginal cost of effort, C0(a). The optimal effort is
decreasing in the agent’s marginal cost and increasing in his productivity parameter
(b) and in his personal share in the firm’s cash flow (vx). However, the agent’s effort
decision is independent of vz because his action does not affect the realization of the
separable random factor z.
Having all of the bargaining power, the principal designs the contract so that the
participation constraint binds. Solving (6) for E[s] and substituting the resulting
expression into (4) yields a simplified objective function for the principal:
Pu ¼ ð1  sÞ  ðE½x  CðaÞ  RðsÞ  UÞ: ð10Þ
The expression in (10) shows that the principal effectively maximizes the after-tax
difference between the expected cash flow, the agent’s cost of effort, the risk pre-
mium, and the agent’s reservation utility. For determining the incentive weights of
the optimal contract, I first recall that vz does not affect the agent’s effort choice but
the variance of his compensation. Since the principal must compensate the agent for
his compensation risk, he uses the weight on the realization of the measurable
random factor for reducing the variance of the agent’s pay. Minimizing (10) with
respect to vz yields the first order condition:
oPu
ovz
¼ ð1  sÞ  oRðsÞ
ovz
¼ 0: ð11Þ
It says that the principal sets vz so that agent’s risk premium is minimized. Solving
(11) for vz yields an incentive weight of
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vz ¼ c  vx; ð12Þ
so that the expressions for the expectation and the variance of the agent’s pay in (7)
and (8) reduce to:
E½sjvz  ¼ w þ vx  b  a; and Var½sjvz  ¼ v2x  r2e : ð13Þ
According to (13), the principal entirely removes the effect of the separable random
factor ez from the agent’s compensation contract. This result can be interpreted as if
the agent’s performance was evaluated on the basis of the ‘‘filtered cash flow’’
m = x - c  z. The performance measure m is less risky and therefore less costly
for the principal than the gross cash flow though offering the same incentives for
effort provision.6
Substituting the agent’s first order condition from (9) and vz from (12) into (10)
and maximizing the resulting expression with respect to a yields the principal’s first
order condition for determining the optimal effort level:
b
1 þ r  C00ðaÞ  r2e=b2
¼ C0ðaÞ: ð14Þ
To induce the desired effort level, the principal places the following incentive
weight on the firm’s cash flows:
vx ¼
C0ðaÞ
b
¼ b
2
b2 þ r  C00ðaÞ  r2e
: ð15Þ
The expression in (15) is the standard result for the optimal incentive weight in a
linear agency model.7 It says that the performance weight in the optimal
compensation contract should increase in the agent’s productivity (b) but decrease
in his coefficient of absolute risk aversion (r), the slope of his marginal effort
cost curve (C@(a)), and the variance of the underlying performance measure
ðr2e Þ:8 The more productive, less costly and less risk averse the agent, the higher
should be the incentive weight in a compensation contract for a given risk in the
underlying performance measure and thus the effort level desired by the
principal. The same solution would obtain in a world without taxes. I conclude
that a proportional corporate income tax does not affect the optimal contract
structure as long as all parts of the agent’s compensation package are fully
tax-deductible.9
6 This result follows from the informativeness principle established by Holmstro¨m (1979).
7 See e.g. Hemmer (2004), or Christensen and Feltham (2005). A formal derivation of the optimal
incentive weight can be found in the Appendix.
8 Referring to the terminology of Banker and Datar (1989) b represents the sensitivity and 1=r2e the
precision of gross cash flow as a signal for the agent’s effort.
9 See Fellingham and Wolfson (1985) for a general analysis of optimal contracting in the presence of
income taxes.
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2.2 Tax constrained solution
2.2.1 General considerations
In this section, I derive the optimal incentive contract for a binding tax constraint.
From (4) and the fact that the agent’s expected pay comprises the fixed salary and
the expected amount of variable pay, that is E[s] = w + E[v], the objective function
of the principal can be written as:
Pc ¼ ð1  sÞðE½x  E½vÞ  w þ s  w: ð16Þ
From (16) a marginal increase of the fixed wage reduces the principal’s wealth by
the factor one. By contrast, a marginal increase of the agent’s variable pay reduces
the principal’s wealth only by the factor (1 - s ) in expectation. In other words, the
tax cap on the fixed salary provides incentives for replacing a part of the agent’s flat
pay by an increased amount of variable pay.
In the model, the principal has two options for increasing the amount of variable
pay. First, he could raise the bonus coefficient placed on the firm’s cash flow, and
second, he could augment the bonus coefficient placed on the realization of the
random factor ez: Since vz is set to filter the separable noise from the firm’s cash flow
in a world without taxes, the second alternative would be equivalent to an
incomplete filtering of the separable random factor ez from the firm’s cash flow.
A cursory evaluation of the two alternatives suggests raising vx rather than vz
because the former method offers the benefit of providing improved work
incentives, while the latter merely increases the compensation risk without affecting
the agent’s effort choice. However, this conclusion can be misleading because it
ignores the relation between the base salary and the variable components of pay in
the agent’s compensation contract. In the optimal contract, the principal uses the
salary to meet the agent’s participation constraint. Solving (6) for w yields:
w ¼ U þ CðaÞ þ RðsÞ  E½v: ð17Þ
Equation (17) defines the minimum salary for satisfying the agent’s participation
constraint. It comprises the reimbursements for the agent’s reservation utility, his
personal cost, and the risk premium minus the expected amount of variable pay. A
closer inspection of the expression in (17) shows that changing the amount of
variable pay has two countervailing effects. On the one hand, augmenting the amount
of variable pay increases the agent’s expected utility and reduces the minimum salary
for meeting the participation constraint. On the other hand, raising the amount of
variable pay increases the risk premium for which the principal must compensate the
agent and requires a higher base salary for satisfying the participation constraint.10
Because the marginal risk premium is monotonically increasing in the amount of
variable pay, the fixed salary can only be substituted by variable pay if the
incremental increase of variable pay exceeds the incremental increase of the risk
premium. Otherwise an increase of variable pay would require an increase of the
10 These first-order effects apply to an increase of both bonus coefficients, vx and vz. As a second-order
effect, however, an increase of vx also increases the cost of effort, which is not the case for vz.
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fixed salary for satisfying the agent’s participation constraint. More formally,
replacing a part of the salary by variable pay is only feasible if the optimal bonus
coefficients in (15) and (12) satisfy the following condition:
ow
ovi
¼ oRðsÞ
ovi
 oE½v
ovi
\0; ð18Þ
which says that the marginal change of the expected variable pay induced by a
change of the bonus coefficient vi, i [ {x,z}, must be larger than the marginal
increase of the risk premium. Lemma 1 uses condition (18) for defining the feasible
bonus coefficients, vx and vz, in the presence of the tax constraint:
Lemma 1 Condition (18) is always satisfied for the unconstrained bonus
coefficient vz but not for v

x :
Proof See Appendix.
From Lemma 1, the principal can always replace a part of the agent’s salary by
rewarding the agent on the basis of the separable random factor z without violating
the agent’s participation constraint. To see the intuition behind this result, recall that
the marginal risk premium equals zero for vz ¼ vz from condition (11), whereas a
marginal increase of vz augments the agent’s expected utility by E[z] = l.
Accordingly, vz can always be chosen so that the agent’s expected utility is
increasing. This utility difference allows the principal to cut the agents’ salary for
minimizing the corporate tax bill. By contrast, it is not always feasible to achieve
the same end by increasing the weight placed on the firm’s cash flow because the
marginal risk premium evaluated at vx ¼ vx can be smaller or larger than the
marginal increase of the agent’s expected variable pay. This ambiguity explains
why the salary is not automatically replaced by an increased amount of
performance-based pay.
2.2.2 Impact of salary tax cap on reward for luck
For deriving the optimal incentive weight on z, I substitute the expression for w
from (17) into the principal’s objective function in (16) and maximize the resulting
expression with respect to vz. I obtain the following first order condition:
oPc
ovz
¼ s  oE½v
ovz
 oRðsÞ
ovz
¼ 0: ð19Þ
Increasing the bonus coefficient vz has two effects on the firm’s profit: A tax effect,
represented by the first term in (19), and an insurance effect, represented by the
second term in (19). The tax effect measures the marginal tax savings from
replacing a part of the fixed salary by raising the amount of variable pay. Because
variable pay is fully tax-deductible but salaries above w are not, the firm saves a
fraction s of each fixed salary dollar that is converted into variable pay. As
explained above, the insurance effect represents the marginal cost of increasing the
amount of variable pay in the agent’s incentive contract. It is strictly negative
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because increasing the bonus coefficient vz increases the risk premium for which the
principal must reimburse the agent to satisfy his participation constraint.
A comparison with condition (11) shows that in a world without taxes (that is for
s = 0) the insurance term disappears because the principal sets vz ¼ vz for
minimizing the variance of the agent’s pay. However, for s [ 0 and qR(s)/qvz = 0,
the tax effect in (19) equals s  l [ 0. It follows that the tax constrained bonus
coefficient must exceed the optimal bonus coefficient in the unrestricted incentive
contract. Substituting the explicit solutions for the partial derivatives into (19) and
solving for vz yields the following closed form solution:
vz ¼ vz þ d; d ¼
s
r
 l
r2z
: ð20Þ
Comparing the optimal bonus coefficients with and without the tax constraint yields
the following result:
Proposition 1 A corporate tax on salaries provides incentives for rewarding
managers for luck.
Proof For a given incentive weight vx placed on the firm’s cash flow, v

z [ v

z
from (20).
The tax deductibility limit for the fixed wage makes it attractive to replace a part of the
agent’s salary by reward for luck. The amount of this shift in the structure of the
compensation contract depends on the magnitude of the parameter d. Its size is
determined by the tax rate (s), the agent’s coefficient of risk aversion (r), and the mean-
variance ratio of the separable performance measure, ez: It is more attractive for the
principal to substitute part of the fixed wage with variable pay if the tax rate or the mean–
variance ratio of the uncontrollable performance measure ez are high, or if the agent’s risk
aversion is low. A high tax rate makes the use of salaries more costly, while a low risk
aversion and a high mean-variance ratio of ez make reward for luck cheaper. With the
optimal incentive weight vz the expectation and the variance of the agent’s pay become:
E½sjvz  ¼ w þ vx  b  a þ d  l; Var½sjvz  ¼ v2x  r2e þ d2  r2z : ð21Þ
The components of the optimal compensation contract in (21) are different from those
for the unconstrained solution in (13). For given values of w and vx, raising the bonus
coefficient vz by the factor d increases the agent’s expected pay by the amount of
E½sjvz   E½sjvz  ¼ d  l and the variance of pay by the amount of
Var½sjvz   Var½sjvz  ¼ d2  r2z : As a consequence, the principal must pay the agent
an additional risk premium of DRðsÞ ¼ r
2
 d2  r2z : Doing so reduces his tax bill by the
amount of DT ¼ s  d  l: For the optimal value of d in (20), the marginal increase of
the risk premium equals the marginal tax savings, that is, d  r  r2z ¼ s  l:
2.2.3 Impact of salary tax cap on equilibrium effort
To explore the consequences of the tax constraint on the agent’s equilibrium effort, I
note that the agent’s incentive constraint is not affected by the salary tax cap and
substitute the agent’s first order condition from (9) and the optimal incentive weight
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vz from (20) into (16). Maximizing the resulting expression with respect to a yields
the desired effort level from the principal’s perspective:
b  s  ðb  a  C00ðaÞÞ
1 þ r  C00ðaÞ  r2e=b2  s
¼ C0ðaÞ: ð22Þ
Using the agent’s incentive constraint yields the optimal incentive weight placed on
the firm’s cash flow:
vx ¼
C0ðaÞ
b
¼ b
2  s  ðb2  b  a  C00ðaÞÞ
b2 þ r  C00ðaÞ  r2e  s  b2
: ð23Þ
Evaluating the principal’s first order conditions with and without the tax constraint
in (14) and (22) yields the following result:
Proposition 2 A corporate tax on salaries can increase or decrease the agent’s
equilibrium effort. If (18) holds for vx = v

x ; the agent’s effort level increases.
Otherwise the agent’s equilibrium effort is decreasing in the salary tax.
Proof See Appendix.
Proposition 2 renders more precisely the observation made in Lemma 1. It states
that the impact of the tax constraint on the agent’s equilibrium effort, or
equivalently on the bonus coefficient placed on the firm’s cash flow, is determined
by condition (18). In particular, two cases can be distinguished.
Case 1: If qw/qvx \ 0, the marginal increase of the agent’s expected variable pay
caused by an increase of vx exceeds the marginal risk premium. In this case, the
principal replaces a part of the fixed wage by performance-based pay if the binding
tax constraint makes it attractive to cut the agent’s salary.
Case 2: If qw/qvx [ 0, the marginal risk premium exceeds the marginal increase
of the agent’s expected variable pay. In this case, the principal cannot increase the
expected amount of variable pay without violating the agent’s participation
constraint. However, this does not mean that the principal cannot benefit from tax
savings, but he must cut the performance-based part of pay to do so. In particular,
marginally adjusting vx for a given effort level results in a marginal profit change of
oPc=ovx ¼ s  oE½v=ovx  oRðsÞ=ovx\0: The expression is negative for qR(s)/
qvx [ qE[v]/qvx. Because the principal cannot increase his profit by increasing the
performance-based bonus, the only way to benefit from the tax savings consists of a
simultaneous reduction of the salary and the amount of performance-based pay.
2.3 A numerical example
In this section, I provide a numerical example to illustrate the two possible
outcomes of the tax constrained incentive contract. The values in Table 1 have been
computed for the quadratic cost function C(a) = a2/2 and the following common
parameter values: r = 0.1, r2e ¼ r2z ¼ 100; l = 500, c = 1, a tax rate of s = 0.4,
and a tax cap of w ¼ 100: To present illustrative examples for the two possible
cases, I assume different parameter values for the agent’s marginal productivity and
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the reservation utility. For the first scenario (labeled as cases 1a–c), I assume that
b = 25 and U ¼ 200: For the second scenario (labeled as cases 2a–c), I assume that
b = 40 and U ¼ 400: These values ensure that the tax constraint is binding for both
cases.
Case 1a uses the unconstrained solution ðvx ¼ 0:615; vz ¼ vxÞ for solving the
constrained agency problem. It serves as a benchmark for the first set of scenarios in
which the salary and the performance-based bonus are substitutes in designing the
agent’s compensation contract and helps to illustrate the impact of increasing the
bonus parameters vz and vx. Starting from the benchmark scenario, case 1b increases
vz by the factor d = 0.2 (recall that vz ¼ vz þ dÞ: Because vx is left unchanged, the
agent’s effort and the expected cash flow are unaffected by the introduction of
reward for luck, but this adjustment causes a partial substitution of the agent’s salary
by an increased amount of variable pay. This change in the agent’s pay structure
increases the risk premium R(s) and, more important, the after-tax profit Pc:
In case 1c, the principal uses both options for alleviating the consequences of the
tax cap by simultaneously increasing the two bonus coefficients vx and vz to their
optimal levels. As a result, the agents’ effort and the expected cash flow are
increasing as compared with case 1b. In addition, the risk premium and the
substitution between variable and fixed parts of pay are both reinforced. Evidently,
the after-tax profit is higher as in case 1b because the principal implements the
optimal solution of the tax constrained contracting problem.
Case 2a defines the benchmark for the second set of scenarios in which the salary
and the performance-based bonus are complements in designing the agent’s
compensation contract. It uses the unconstrained solution ðvx ¼ 0:385; vz ¼ vxÞ
for solving the constrained agency problem and helps to illustrate the impact of
augmenting vz and decreasing vx. Case 2b leaves the performance-based bonus
unchanged and introduces reward for luck into the agent’s compensation contract.
The consequences of this adjustment are qualitatively identical to case 1b.
The most interesting scenario is case 2c, where the principal simultaneously
reduces the performance-based bonus and rewards the agent for luck. To isolate the
impact of decreasing vx, it is helpful to compare cases 2b and 2c because vz is held
constant in both. Clearly, a reduction of vx reduces the agent’s equilibrium effort
and the expected cash flow. This undesirable effect is to some extent compensated
by a reduction in the agent’s total compensation, but the net profit before taxes is
still declining. In particular, the expected cash flow decreases by the amount of
Table 1 Example results for the tax constrained LEN model
Case vx d a E[x] E[v] w R(s) Pc
1a: Pðvx ; vz Þ 0.615 0 24.62 1484.62 605.92 286.39 189.35 208.83
1b: Pðvx ; vz Þ 0.615 0.2 24.62 1484.62 705.92 206.39 209.35 228.83
1c: Pðvx ; vz Þ 0.727 0.2 29.09 1663.64 946.28 161.32 284.46 237.09
2a: Pðvx ; vz Þ 0.385 0 9.62 740.38 92.46 227.74 73.96 129.02
2b: Pðvx ; vz Þ 0.385 0.2 9.62 740.38 192.45 147.74 93.96 149.02
2c: Pðvx ; vz Þ 0.333 0.2 8.33 708.33 169.44 140.84 75.56 150.50
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32.05 and the expected compensation (i.e. E[v] + w) decreases by the amount of
29.91, so that the net profit before taxes declines by 2.14.
However, the relevant measure for firm performance is the profit after taxes,
which increases by the amount of 1.48 due to the structural change of the agent’s
compensation contract. The key is that a reduction of salaries above the tax cap of
w ¼ 100 reduces the company’s taxes by the factor s = 0.4. Adding the salary
reduction of 6.90 and the gross profit reduction of 2.14 yields an overall reduction of
the taxable profit by the amount of 9.04. Because the resulting tax savings of
9.04  s & 3.62 are higher than the reduction of the pre-tax profit, the after-tax
profit is higher than without a reduction of the performance-based bonus vx.
The example underlines that the solution of the tax-constrained incentive
problem depends on whether the salary and the performance-based bonus are
substitutes or complements in designing the compensation contract. In the first case,
the performance-based bonus is increasing; in the second case, it is decreasing. In
both cases, the principal adds reward for luck to the optimal contract because reward
for luck and the salary are always substitutes (qw/qvz \ 0). I conclude that the tax
cap on salaries always causes at least one undesirable outcome.
3 Discussion of results and implications for empirical research
3.1 Discussion of the LEN model results
My analysis shows that limiting the tax deductibility of nonperformance-related pay
can significantly distort the structure of optimal compensation contracts. The tax
constraint makes wealth transfer between the principal and the agent more costly.
As a direct consequence, a firm that would otherwise pay a fixed wage above w has
an incentive to cut the agent’s salary in response to the tax constraint. This direct
effect corresponds to the intention of section IRC 162(m) and the empirical
evidence provided by Perry and Zenner (2001) and Hall and Liebman (2000). Both
studies report a decline in salaries but also find that the decline in salary is more than
offset by an increased amount of performance-based compensation.
My theoretical results suggest that the observed substitution effect between flat
and variable pay is more subtle than it seems at first glance. In my model, the tax
deductibility limit has two separate effects.
– A part of the fixed wage is substituted by reward for luck.
– The actual amount of performance-based pay—that is, the bonus coefficient
placed on the firm’s cash flow—can increase or decrease with the tax constraint.
Taken together, these effects give rise to two different scenarios. In the first, the
tax constraint induces reward for luck and an increasing equilibrium effort. In the
second, the tax constraint induces reward for luck and a declining equilibrium effort.
From a managerial perspective, both scenarios are undesirable because they reduce
the firm’s profit as compared with the unrestricted solution of the agency problem.
From a regulatory perspective, however, the second scenario must be considered as
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the worse case because the tax constraint does not only provide incentives for
increasing the amount of non-performance-based pay but also to cut the actual
amount of performance-based pay.
In my linear agency model, reward for luck takes the form of incomplete filtering
of a separate random variable in the firm’s cash flow. Empirical compensation
research has found that companies rather reward their executives for luck by using
completely unfiltered performance measures instead of optimally adjusting them.
Well known examples are the use of nonindexed stock and option grants (for
example Hall and Murphy 2003). In the context of my model, this policy would be
equivalent with setting vz = 0, so that the agent’s performance would be evaluated
on the basis of the firm’s cash flows.
To see if the firm can benefit from introducing reward for luck by means of
unfiltered performance measures, I compare two extreme policies. The first consists
of perfectly filtering the separable noise from the performance measure, and the
second evaluates the agent’s performance on the basis of the unfiltered cash flow.
With full filtering (that is for vz = -c  vx) the relevant performance measure is
m = x - c  z, so that the expected tax-constrained profit in (16) becomes
Pf ¼ ð1  sÞE½x  CðaÞ  U  r
2
v2x  r2e þ s  vx  ðE½x  c  lÞ þ w½ :
Without any filtering (that is for vz = 0), the expected profit equals
Pn ¼ ð1  sÞE½x  CðaÞ  U  r
2
v2x  r2e þ c2  r2z
 þ s  ðvx  E½x þ wÞ:
For a given bonus coefficient vx, the use of the unfiltered performance measure is
strictly preferred if
Pn  Pf ¼ s  vx  c  l  r
2
 v2x  c2  r2z [ 0: ð24Þ
Condition (24) compares the total tax savings from substituting a part of the salary
by reward for luck with the additional risk premium associated with this policy.
Whether condition (24) is satisfied depends on the relative magnitude of the
parameters.11 Rearranging terms in (24) shows that the unfiltered performance
measure is preferred if d[ (vx  c)/2, where d is the optimal weight on z with partial
filtering as defined in (20). I conclude that ‘‘no filtering’’ is more likely to dominate
‘‘full filtering’’ if reward for luck is a relatively important element in the optimal
contract, so that the model predictions remain valid even if the firms do not practice
partial filtering.
According to my analysis, a tax cap on salaries does not only provide incentives
for rewarding luck but also affects the optimal amount of performance-based pay and
thus the agent’s equilibrium effort. In my model, the amount of performance-based
pay can either decline or increase. As shown in Sect. 2, the direction of the change
depends on the relative magnitude of the marginal changes in performance-based
11 Condition (24) states that no filtering is preferred for an arbitrary incentive weight vx if
PnðvxÞ[ Pf ðvxÞ: Because Pn and Pf are strictly concave in vx, the same relation must also hold for
the optimal bonus coefficients vnx and v
f
x because PnðvnxÞ[PnðvxÞ for all vx including vfx; so that
PnðvnxÞ[ PnðvfxÞ[ Pf ðvfxÞ:
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compensation and the agent’s risk premium. In particular, the principal can only
make up a declining salary with an increased amount of performance-based pay if the
marginal risk premium is smaller than the expected value of a marginal change in
performance-based pay. Otherwise, he can only satisfy the agent’s participation
constraint by reducing the amount of performance-based pay.
In the linear agency model, the relation between the salary tax cap and
performance-based pay is closely related to the structure of the optimal compen-
sation contract, and the conditions under which the tax constraint becomes relevant
for designing it. Evidently, the tax constraint can only become relevant if the salary
in the unconstrained linear agency model is positive. Slightly rearranging terms
in (17) and taking into account that E½vjvz  ¼ vx  oE½v=ovx; and Rðsjvz Þ ¼
ðvx=2Þ  oRðsÞ=ovx yields a positive salary if the following condition is met12:
U þ CðaÞ[ vx  oE½vovx 
1
2
 oRðsÞ
ovx
 
: ð25Þ
The unconstrained fixed wage is positive if the sum of the agent’s reservation utility
and his cost of effort is larger than the difference between his expected marginal
compensation and half of the marginal risk premium. Figure 1 shows the relation
between condition (25) and the condition determining the sign of the marginal rate
of substitution between w and vx in (18) as a function of the marginal rate of
expected performance-based pay (qE[v]/qvx):
If qE[v]/qvx \ (qR(s)/qvx)/2, the right hand side of (25) is negative and w* is
unambiguously positive. If qE[v]/qvx [ (qR(s)/qvx)/2, it is not clear if the salary in
the unconstrained contract is positive or negative because both sides of (25) are
positive. Similarly, the sign of qw/qvx is positive if qE[v]/qvx [ qR(s)/qvx, and it is
negative if the opposite is true. Taken together, these two relations suggest the
following: an unambiguously positive salary in the unconstrained contract implies
that w and vx are complements. If w and vx are substitutes, however, the sign of the
unconstrained salary is ambiguous so that it is not clear if the tax constraint is
binding because w* can also be negative. It is therefore likely that qw/qvx [ 0 in
those cases where the tax constraint affects the structure of the incentive contract, so
xv
sR
∂
∂ )(
2
10
0>
∂
∂
xv
w 0<
∂
∂
xv
w
0* >w sign of w* ambiguous
xv
sR
∂
∂ )( ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
xv
vE ][
Fig. 1 The relation between the
sign of w* and qw/qvx in the
linear agency model
12 Note that for the unconstrained optimal contract, vz ¼ c  vx from (12), so that the expected amount
of variable pay and the risk premium become E½vjvz  ¼ vx  b  a and Rðsjvz Þ ¼ r2  v2x  r2e :
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that the performance-based bonus is cut after the introduction of a tax cap on
salaries.
Further insights into the relevant contract structure for a binding tax constraint
can be gained by assuming a specific cost function that allows for deriving a closed
form solution of the contract parameters. In particular, for a quadratic cost function
of the type C(a) = k  a2/2 condition (25) becomes
U [
ðvxÞ2
2
 b
2
k
 r  r2e
 
: ð26Þ
The sign of the right hand side of (26) depends on the sign of the term in brackets.
With the quadratic cost function a* = vx  b/k, so that ow=ovx ¼ vx
ðb2=k  r  r2e Þ: It follows that the sign of the expressions in (25) and (18) is
determined by the same term.
Moreover, using the definition of the optimal bonus coefficient in (15), it can be
shown that the term b2=k  r  r2e is negative if vx\1=2 and positive if vx [ 1=2:
The example shows that the sign of the fixed wage in the unconstrained contract
usually depends on the size of the bonus coefficient. For small bonus coefficients,
the fixed wage is always positive. If the bonus coefficient becomes larger, the sign
of the salary depends on the agent’s reservation utility. For the example cost
function w* becomes negative if vx [ 1=2 and U is normalized to zero, as is
assumed in many agency models. The same effect can be seen in the example given
in Sect. 2.3. For the first scenario (cases 1a–c), where the tax constraint induces an
increasing equilibrium effort, vx ¼ 0:615; and for the second scenario (cases 2a–c),
where the tax constraint implies a decreasing equilibrium effort, vx ¼ 0:385:
3.2 A binary agency model with reward for luck
The first key result of my paper is the insight that a tax cap on salaries induces
reward for luck regardless of its impact on the agent’s equilibrium effort. As
mentioned in the introduction, Halperin et al. (2001) study the impact of tax
distortions on the structure of executive pay in the context of a binary agency model,
but they do not allow for tying the agent’s compensation to a separable random
factor. To complete the picture, it seems interesting to explore if Proposition 1
continues to hold in the context of a binary agency model.
To keep the analysis concise, I restrict my attention to the canonical version of
the binary agency model with two different effort levels.13 The model considers a
risk-neutral principal and a risk- and effort-averse agent with an additively separable
utility function U() - C(a), where U0() [ 0, U@() \ 0. The firm’s cash flow
equals ex ¼ ey þ ez; where ey and ez are independent binary random variables. I assume
that both variables are separately observable and contractible. As in Sect. 1, the
probability distribution of ez is independent of the agent’s effort, while the
distribution of ey depends on the agent’s effort.
13 See e.g. Christensen and Demski (2003), chapter 11.
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The agent’s effort can take the values aH and aL, causing personal cost
C(aH) = cH and C(aL) = cL with aH [ aL, and cH [ cL. The controllable part of the
firm’s cash flow, y, can take values yH with probability pH (pL) and yL with
probability 1 - pH (1 - pL) if the agent exerts high (low) effort, where
yH [ yL [ 0. The uncontrollable part of the firm’s cash flow can take the values
zH with probability p and zL with probability 1 - p, where zH [ zL [ 0 so that
E½ez[ 0:
The bonus contract, s(x), takes the following form: as usual for this model class,
the agent receives a fixed salary w and a performance-based bonus, by if ey ¼ yH :
The novel element in my analysis is the additional bonus bz that is paid if ez ¼ zH :
This second bonus is clearly not performance-based because the realizations of ez are
independent of the agent’s effort. The resulting distributions of the firm’s cash flow
and the agent’s compensation are summarized in Table 2:
For addressing a nontrivial problem, I assume that the principal desires high
effort, so that he maximizes his after-tax income
P ¼ ð1  sÞ  yL þ pH yH  yL  by
 þ E½z  p  bz
  w þ s  w ð27Þ
with respect to w, by, and bz subject to the agent’s participation and incentive
constraints:
E UL½  þ pH  E UH½   E UL½ ð Þ  cH U; ð28Þ
ðpH  pLÞ  E UH½   E UL½ ð Þ ðcH  cLÞ: ð29Þ
Condition (28) assures that the agent accepts the contract and condition (29) that he
chooses the desired effort level. The expressions E Uj
  ¼ E Ujyj
 
; j 2 fL; Hg;
denote the agent’s expected utilities from performance-based compensation for
given realizations of the controllable random variable ey: They are defined as
follows:
E Uj
  ¼ UðxjÞ þ p  Uðxj þ bzÞ  UðxjÞ
 
;
where xL = w, and xH = w + by. Assuming that the principal designs the contract
so that both constraints bind, the optimal contract must satisfy the following two
conditions:
E UL½  ¼ U þ cH  pH  ðcH  cLÞðpH  pLÞ ð30Þ
E UH½  ¼ U þ cH þ ð1  pHÞ  ðcH  cLÞðpH  pLÞ ð31Þ
Table 2 Distribution of cash flows and compensation in the binary agency model
x xHH = yH + zH xHL = yH + zL xLH = yL + zH xLL = yL + zL
s(x) w + by + bz w + by w + bz w
prob (x|aH) p  pH (1 - p)  pH p  (1 - pH) (1 - p)  (1 - pH)
prob (x|aL) p  pL (1 - p)  pL p  (1 - pL) (1 - p)  (1 - pL)
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From (30) the agent’s expected utility derived from compensation given that yL is
realized equals his reservation utility plus his cost of effort minus the expected
bonus for a high performance. The bonus is measured in expected utility terms and
equals DU ¼ E UH½   E UL½ ; so that E UH½  ¼ E UL½  þ DU; and the agent’s
expected utility derived from the optimal contract equals E½U ¼
ð1  pHÞ  E UL½  þ pH  E UH½  ¼ U þ cH :
If the tax constraint does not bind, bz must equal zero because ez is neither
controllable by the agent nor informative about his effort. As in the linear model, a
bonus based on the realization of ez would increase the agent’s compensation risk
without providing additional incentives. Let s1 denote the optimal unconstrained
contract in a world without a discriminating taxation of salaries. With a salary of w1
and a performance-based bonus of by1 this contract causes an expected after-tax cost
of K(s1) = (1 - s)  (w1 + pH  by1) for the principal and yields an expected utility
of E[U(s1)] = pH  U(w1 + by1) + (1 - pH)  U(w1) for the agent.
If the tax constraint is introduced and binding, the after-tax cost of contract s1 jumps
up to Kðs1Þ ¼ Kðs1Þ þ s  ðw1  wÞ: This increase of the expected compensation cost
provides incentives to offer the agent a new contract s2 specifying a nonperformance-
based bonus of bz2 [ 0 and a lower salary to limit taxes. To make the agent indifferent
between the old and the new contract, the new contract must satisfy that E[UL(s2)] C
U(w1) and E[UH(s2)] C U(w1 + by1). To meet these conditions, the principal sets the
salary and the bonus so that w1 = w2 + p  bz2 - qL and by2 = by1 - (qL - qH),
where
qj ¼ xj þ p  bz2  U1ðE Uj
 Þ; j 2 fL; Hg; ð32Þ
is defined as the risk premium of the income lottery Lj: = [(1 - p)  xj,
p  (xj + bz)] that the new contract adds to the state contingent wealth levels
xL = w2 and xH = w2 + by2. The first term in (32) is the expected value of the
income lottery Lj, and the second term is the agent’s certainty equivalent.
The principal’s after-tax cost of the new contract are Kðs2Þ ¼ Kðs2Þþ
s  ðw2  wÞ; where K(s2) = (1 - s)  (w2 + pH  by2 + p  bz2). For making the
switch from s1 to s2 attractive, it must be that Kðs2Þ\Kðs1Þ or, equivalently, that
Kðs2Þ  Kðs1Þ\s  ðw1  w2Þ: ð33Þ
Condition (33) requires that the tax savings associated with the adoption of contract
s2 must exceed the cost of increasing the agent’s compensation risk under contract
s2. Substituting the definitions of K(s1), K(s2), w2, and w1 into (33) and rearranging
terms shows that it is sufficient to set bz so that it satisfies
bz2 [
qL þ ð1  sÞ  pH  ðqH  qLÞ
p  s
to reduce the expected compensation cost. Because bz is not restricted, this
condition can always be met without reducing the agent’s expected utility. The
intuitive cost comparison of alternative contracts with identical utility shows that
the result in Proposition 1 is also valid in the context of a binary agency model.14
14 A formal proof of this result is provided in the Appendix.
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I next analyze whether the introduction of reward for luck affects the impact of
the tax constraint on the agent’s bonus. Consider again the move from contract s1
specifying bz1 = 0 to contract s2 with bz2 [ 0. From the definition of the
performance-based bonus, by2 = by1 - (qL - qH), the introduction of reward for
luck reduces the performance-based bonus whenever the risk premiums of the
income lotteries LL and LH satisfy that qL [ qH. Intuitively, the compensation
contract s2 adds an identical amount of noise to the utility levels derived from
receiving the performance-based payments U(w2) and U(w2 + by2). Comparing the
risk premiums qL and qH is therefore equivalent to comparing a given lottery for the
same individual with different levels of wealth. Because increasing wealth implies a
nonincreasing risk premium it must be that qH B qL.
15 It follows that the
performance-based bonus by is (weakly) decreasing in bz. As in the linear agency
model for the case where qw/qvx \ 0, there is a substitution effect between reward
for luck and the performance-based bonus.
The following example illustrates the binary model with discrete effort and
demonstrates that performance- and nonperformance-based bonuses can be
substitutes in a binary agency model. The agent has utility function U ¼ ﬃﬃsp ; the
cost of effort are cH = 4 and cL = 0, and the corresponding probabilities for y = yH
are pH = 0.8 and pL = 0.4. The reservation utility equals U ¼ 10; and the
probability of receiving a nonperformance-based bonus equals p = 0.5. Table 3
exhibits six possible solutions for the contracting problem:
The benchmark solution is the optimal contract for a world without taxes (case
1). The optimal salary equals w* = 36, the performance-based bonus is by ¼ 220;
and the expected cost is 212. If taxes are introduced but all compensation is tax
deductible, the optimal solution is case 2. The contract parameters are not changed
as compared with case 1 but the cost of compensating the agent drops to 169.6
because compensation is tax deductible. If the principal would deviate from the
optimal solution and pay the agent a nonperformance-based-bonus of bz = 50, the
compensation cost jumps up to 170.7 because the principal must compensate the
agent for the additional risk in his compensation (case 3).
Table 3 Solutions of the binary agency model for different contracting environments
Case s w w by bz K(s) Optimal
1: no tax, no tax cap, no reward for luck 0.0 none 36 220 0 212.0 yes
2: tax, no tax cap, no reward for luck 0.2 none 36 220 0 169.6 yes
3: tax, no tax cap, reward for luck 0.2 none 15 216 50 170.7 no
4: low tax with cap, reward for luck 0.2 10 11 214 64 171.6 yes
5: low tax with cap, no reward for luck 0.2 10 36 220 0 174.8 no
6: high tax with cap, reward for luck 0.4 10 10 206 98 128.7 yes
15 This is a standard result in expected utility theory. It holds for most concave utility functions with strict
inequality. An exception are exponential utility functions for which the risk premium is a constant. See
e.g. Mas-Colell et al. (1995) for a formal proof.
470 R. F. Go¨x
123
In case 4, the tax cap becomes relevant. As a consequence the principal pays the
agent a nonperformance-based bonus of bz ¼ 64; reduces the salary to w* = 11,
and the performance-based bonus to by ¼ 214: Although the tax cap increases the
compensation cost to 171.6, rewarding the agent for luck saves compensation cost
as compared with case 5, where bz = 0, and the expected compensation cost is
174.8. In case 6, the tax rate goes up to 0.4, and the salary is cut to the lowest
reasonable value for tax saving purposes, that is, w ¼ w: Due to the increased tax
rate, the amount of reward for luck increases to bz ¼ 98; and the performance-based
bonus is cut further to by ¼ 206:
So far, the binary agency model presented above confirms the main results of the
linear agency model (for the case where qw/qvx \ 0), but it allows no prediction
about the impact of the tax constraint on the agent’s equilibrium effort. By contrast,
Halperin et al. (2001) consider a binary agency model with continuous effort and
find that the introduction of a tax cap on salaries causes an increasing bonus and
raises the agent’s equilibrium effort. This result is consistent with the first but not
with the second part of Proposition 2. To explain the reason for this difference, I
present the agent’s participation constraint in Halperin et al. (2001) using the
notation of the binary agency model above:
UA ¼ UðwÞ þ a  Uðw þ byÞ  UðwÞ
  CðaÞ  U  0: ð34Þ
The expression in (34) is a slightly modified version of (28) for p = 0, where cH is
replaced by a strictly convex cost function C(a) as in the linear agency model of
Sect. 1, and the probability pH is replaced by the agent’s effort.
16 To see how a
change of the agent’s salary affects his bonus, I derive the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between w and by by totally differentiating the agent’s participation
constraint, using the fact that qUA/qa = 0 from the agent’s incentive constraint:
dby
dw
¼  oUA=ow
oUA=oby
¼ 1  ð1  aÞ
a
 U
0ðwÞ
U0ðw þ byÞ\0:
The sign of the expression is negative for all possible effort levels, so that the salary
and the bonus are substitutes for all feasible values of w and by. This observation
shows why the result of Halperin et al. (2001) is not consistent with the second part
of Proposition 2. A scenario where the salary and the bonus are complements in
designing the agent’s compensation contract as in the linear agency model cannot
arise in the Halperin et al. (2001) setting.
Although the two model classes are not directly comparable in all details, the
conflicting prediction regarding the agent’s equilibrium effort can be explained by a
closer inspection of the marginal risk premiums in both models. In the linear agency
model, the conflicting prediction about the optimal contract in the presence of the
tax constraint arises if the marginal risk premium exceeds the expected marginal
amount of variable pay. This scenario is possible in the linear model because the
marginal risk premium is increasing in the agent’s equilibrium effort. In the model
16 Because the agent’s effort is modeled as a probability, a is restricted to take values between 0 and 1.
See Halperin et al. (2001) for a detailed description of the model details, and the discussion of Sansing
(2001) for numerical examples.
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of Halperin et al. (2001), this case is excluded because the marginal risk premium is
decreasing in the agent’s equilibrium effort. In particular, the optimal contract
specifies that UðwÞ ¼ U þ CðaÞ  a  C0ðaÞ and U(w + by) = C0(a) - U(w), so
that the agent’s expected utility equals E½UA ¼ U þ CðaÞ: The risk premium of the
optimal contract equals
q ¼ w þ a  by  U1ðU þ CðaÞÞ; ð35Þ
where w + a  by is the expected amount of pay, and U1ðU þ CðaÞÞ is the certainty
equivalent of the income lottery induced by the optimal contract. Because C(a) is
strictly convex, the second derivative of the expression in (35) with respect to a is
negative, so that the marginal risk premium is decreasing in a, and the agent’s
marginal certainty equivalent is increasing in a. Accordingly, the principal can always
substitute a part of the agent’s salary by an appropriate increase of the bonus without
reducing the agent’s net utility if the tax constraint makes it attractive to do so.
3.3 Implications for empirical compensation research
The association between executive pay and firm performance is usually studied by
regressing the amount of remuneration on various measures of firm performance. In
my model, firm performance is measured in terms of the realization of the firm’s
cash flow. The agent’s total remunerations with and without the tax constraint are
given by the following expressions:
s ¼ w þ vx  m; s ¼ w þ vx  m þ d  z; ð36Þ
where m = x - c  z is the realization of the filtered cash flow. A multiple
regression of remuneration on filtered cash flow that controls for the separable
random factor would take the general form
s ¼ b0 þ bm  m þ bz  z þ g; ð37Þ
where b0, bm and bz are the regression coefficients and g is the residual of the
regression equation. For a world without tax deductibility limits on salaries, in
which all firms would set compensation contracts according to s*, my model pre-
dicts the following regression coefficients:
bb0 ¼ w; bbm ¼ vx ; bbz ¼ 0: ð38Þ
In a world with a tax on nonperformance-based compensation, however, firms
would determine the parameters of their compensation contracts according to s**,
and the predicted regression coefficients would be as follows:
bb0 ¼ w; bbm ¼ vx ; bbz ¼ d: ð39Þ
A comparison of the regression coefficients in (38) and (39) shows that a one-to-one
estimation of my theoretical model should yield a positive relation between the
agent’s pay and the separable random factor in the firm’s cash flow. According to
the definition of d in (20), the regression coefficient bbz should increase with the
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corporate tax rate s and the mean-variance ratio of ez because both factors make
wealth transfers based on ez relatively more attractive. A high tax rate raises the
direct cost of salary-based wealth transfers, while a high mean-variance ratio of ez
lowers the additional risk premium for rewarding the agent for luck.
Similar observations would be made if the firm rewarded the agent for luck by
not filtering any noise from the performance measure instead of using a partial
filtering strategy. In this case the optimal contract would be sn ¼ wn þ vnx  mþ
vnx  c  z; and the predicted regression coefficients for the regression equation (37)
would equal bbnm ¼ vnx and bbz ¼ vnx  c:
The predictions of my model are consistent with the findings of Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001), who estimate the luck effect with a two-stage regression
approach and attribute their findings to managerial entrenchment. Since my model
predicts that bbz ¼ 0 in the absence of tax constraints, it would be interesting to test
the explanatory power of both theoretical explanations in a joint regression
approach that controls for firm specific governance variables and for the firms’
exposition to section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code.
My analysis further predicts that a multiple regression that controls for separable
measures of luck should yield a smaller salary ðbb0 \bb0Þ while the pay for
performance sensitivity can either increase or decline ðbbm 7bbmÞ after the
introduction of a tax on nonperformance-based pay. The first result is in line with
Perry and Zenner (2001) and Hall and Liebman (2000), but the second result is only
consistent with my theoretical analysis if the salary and the bonus are substitutes in
designing the agent’s compensation contract. One reason for this difference may be
that these empirical studies have only considered firms in which the pay structures
are so that qw/qvx \ 0. The second reason may be that the pay structures of the
sample firms can be better captured by a binary model with continuous effort as in
Halperin et al. (2001).
A third and less obvious explanation is that the sample firms in fact use linear
contracts but that the empirical studies do not control for separable measures of luck in
their regressions. In particular, assume that qw/qvx [ 0 in the unconstrained contract,
so that the performance-based part of the agent’s compensation declines. A pay for
performance regression ignoring the possibility of reward for luck would estimate the
pay for performance sensitivity according to the following regression equation:
s ¼ c0 þ cx  x þ g; ð40Þ
where c0 and cx are the regression coefficients. According to the results of my
theoretical analysis, estimating Eq. 40 instead of Eq. 37 would yield the following
pay for performance sensitivities in a world with and without a tax deductibility
limit for nonperformance-based pay:
bcx ¼ vx 
r2e
r2x
; bcx ¼
vx  r2e þ c  d  r2z
r2x
; ð41Þ
where the expressions in the numerators of (41) are the respective covariances
between cash flow and total remuneration under the two different tax regimes, and
r2x ¼ r2e þ c  r2z from the definition of x in (1).
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Comparing the pay for performance sensitivities from the undifferentiated
regression in (41) with those of the differentiated regression in (38) and (39) shows
that the lack of control for separable measures of luck generally yields biased
regression results. In particular, I find that bcx\bb

m because r
2
e\r
2
x ; and that
bcx [ bb

m if d  vx [ 0: Thus, the expected pay for performance sensitivities from
an undifferentiated regression will generally be biased downward in a world without
tax-deductibility limits. With a tax cap on salaries the direction of the bias depends
on the relative magnitude of reward for luck versus performance-based pay. The
bias is positive, if the marginal reward for luck, d, exceeds the weight on the firm’s
cash flow, vx : Otherwise the bias is negative.
More important, if I compare the predicted results for the undifferentiated
regressions with and without tax caps on salaries, I find that bcx [bc

x if
c  d  r2z [ ðvx  vx Þ  r2e : In other words, empirical studies are likely to find an
increased pay for performance sensitivity as a consequence of section 162(m)
although the pay for performance sensitivity has declined. From the definition of d
in (20) the critical condition for estimating a positive effect of section 162(m) on the
pay for performance sensitivity can be rewritten as
c  l[ ðvx  vx Þ 
r  r2e
s
: ð42Þ
Keeping the factors on the right hand side of (42) constant, wrongly estimating an
increased pay for performance sensitivity is more likely if luck plays a relatively
important role for firm performance (that is for large values of c and l). Intuitively,
it is much easier to confuse firm performance with the performance of the firm’s
management if firm performance is significantly affected by factors beyond the
management’s control.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies the consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries for the
structure of incentive contracts. The analysis is based on a linear agency model in
which the firm’s cash flow is modeled as a function of the agent’s effort and an
observable random factor. In the absence of tax restrictions, the observable random
factor is filtered from the performance measure because it makes the contract riskier
without providing better incentives. I demonstrate that the introduction of a tax-
deductibility limit on salaries induces the principal to substitute part of the fixed
wage by increasing the amount of variable pay. However, the increase of variable
pay consists at least in part of a reward for luck, while the agent’s work incentives
can increase or decline as compared with the unconstrained incentive contract.
These results imply two different scenarios. In the first, the tax constraint induces
reward for luck and an increasing equilibrium effort. In the second, the tax
constraint induces reward for luck and a declining equilibrium effort. Both scenarios
are undesirable from the firm’s perspective because they reduce profit. From a
regulatory perspective, however, the second scenario is clearly the worse case
because the tax constraint provides incentives to substitute performance-based pay
with reward for luck.
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The theoretical results have important implications for empirical compensation
research. First, my analysis predicts a positive relation between the agent’s pay and
the separable random factor in the firm’s cash flow. Accordingly, reward for luck
can be an optimal response to recent tax law changes, while earlier empirical
literature has attributed this phenomenon to managerial entrenchment. Future
empirical studies might reconsider the problem and provide evidence on the relative
importance of the managerial entrenchment and the tax hypotheses.
Second, I show that a simple pay for performance regression that fails to control
for observable measures of luck is likely to attribute an increased pay for
performance sensitivity to the one-million-dollar tax cap although the pay for
performance sensitivity has declined. These observations suggest that it is important
to control for separable measures of luck in pay for performance regressions.
Otherwise the empirical results will generally not provide reliable insights into the
actual pay practices of firms.
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Appendix
1. Derivation of the unconstrained incentive weight (Eq. 15):
Substituting the results for the optimal effort and vz from (9) and (12) into (10)
yields
Pu ¼ ð1  sÞ  b  a þ c  l  CðaÞ  r
2
C0ðaÞ
b
 2
 r2e  U
 !
:
Maximizing this expression with respect to a yields the following first order
condition
oPu
oa
¼ ð1  sÞ  b  C0ðaÞ 1 þ r  C00ðaÞ  r2e=b2
   ¼ 0:
Solving this condition for C0(a) yields (14), and using the fact that vx = C0(a)/b
from (9) yields (15).(
2. Proof of Lemma 1:
(a) Substituting the expression for the variance and the expectation of the agent’s
pay from (7) and (8) into (17) yields the optimal salary as a function of vx and vz
wðvx; vzÞ ¼ U þ CðaÞ þ r
2
 v2x  r2e þ ðvx  c þ vzÞ2  r2z  vx  b  a  ðvx  c þ vzÞ  l:
Differentiating this expression and evaluating the solution for the unconstrained
optimal contract parameters yields
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owðvx; vzÞ
ovz








vx¼vx ;vz¼vz
¼ l\0 ð43Þ
owðvx; vzÞ
ovx








vx¼vx ;vz¼vz
¼ r  vx  r2e  b  a ð44Þ
Since (43) is strictly negative, but (44) is positive if r  vx  r2e [ b  a; condition (18)
is always satisfied for vz but not for v

x : (
3. Proof of Proposition 2:
(a) Substituting the results for the optimal effort and vz from (9) and (20) into
(16) yields
Pc ¼ ð1  sÞðb  a þ c  lÞ  CðaÞ  r
2
C0ðaÞ2
b2
 r2e þ d2  r2z
 !
 U þ s  ðC0ðaÞ  a þ d  l þ wÞ:
Maximizing this expression with respect to a yields the following first-order condition
oPc
oa
¼ ð1  sÞ  b  C0ðaÞ 1 þ r  C00ðaÞ  r2e=b2
 
þ s  ðC00ðaÞ  a þ C0ðaÞÞ ¼ 0:
ð45Þ
Rearranging terms and solving this condition for C0(a) yields the condition for the
desired effort level, a**, in (22).
(b) After rearranging terms, (45) can be written as follows:
oPc
oa
¼ oPu
oa
þ s  C00ðaÞ  a  C0ðaÞ  r  r2e=b2
 
: ð46Þ
Evaluating the expression in (46) at the unconstrained optimal effort level a* yields
oPc
oa








a¼a
¼ s  C00ðaÞ  a  C0ðaÞ  r  r2e=b2
 
:
Evidently, a** [ a* if the term in brackets is positive, or, because C0ðaÞ=b ¼ vx
from (9), if
b  a [ vx  r  r2e : ð47Þ
Otherwise, a** \ a*. Evidently, (47) is equivalent to (18) from (44). (
4. Proof of Proposition 1 for the binary agency model:
(a) The principal’s problem consists of maximizing (27) subject to (28) and (29),
which is equivalent to maximizing the following Lagrangian:
L ¼ð1  sÞ  yL þ pH yH  yL  by
 þ E½z  w  p  bz
  s  ðw  wÞ
þ k  E UL½  þ pH  E UH½   E UL½ ð Þ  cH  U½ 
þ l  E UH½   E UL½ ð Þ  cH  cL
pH  pL
 
:
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For given values of k, l, and by assume that w [ 0 and bz = 0, so that the Kuhn–
Tucker-conditions are satisfied if
oL
ow
¼ 1 þ k  oE UL½ 
ow
þ ðk  pH þ lÞ  oE UH½ ow 
oE UL½ 
ow
 
¼ 0 ð48Þ
oL
obz
¼ p  ð1  sÞ þ k  oE UL½ 
obz
þ ðk  pH þ lÞ  oE UH½ obz 
oE UL½ 
obz
 
\0; ð49Þ
where
oE UL½ 
ow
¼ p  U0ðw þ bzÞ þ ð1  pÞ  U0ðwÞ
oE UH½ 
ow
¼ p  U0ðw þ by þ bzÞ þ ð1  pÞ  U0ðw þ byÞ
oE UL½ 
obz
¼ p  U0ðw þ bzÞ
oE UH½ 
obz
¼ p  U0ðw þ by þ bzÞ;
so that for bz = 0
oE UL½ 
obz
¼ p  oE UL½ 
ow
oE UH½ 
obz
¼ p  oE UH½ 
ow
substituting these expressions into (48) and (49) rearranging terms yields
k  oE UL½ 
ow
þ ðk  pH þ lÞ  oE UH½ ow 
oE UL½ 
ow
 
¼ 1
k  oE UL½ 
ow
þ ðk  pH þ lÞ  oE UH½ ow 
oE UL½ 
ow
 
\ð1  sÞ;
a contradiction. I conclude that bz [ 0 (
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